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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
Burr.nING RtsTRIC'rioNs-Smcr.r: PRIVAT£ Dw£LUNG ON

Om:

Im-WHAT

ONJ; Im ?-Land was platted into sixty foot lots and conveyed from time to
time to various purchasers subject to restriction, inter alia, that "There shall
be nothing but a single private dwelling with the necessary outbuildings
erected on each lot." Defendant became the owner of the westerly ten feet of
lot so and the easterly forty feet of lot SI ; the remaining twenty feet of lot
SI and the whole of lot s2 adjoining lot SI on the other side became the property of plaintiff. Defendant being about to build a dwelling on the fifty feet
owned by him, plaintiff sought to enjoin such building as being in violation
of the restriction. Held, (Brooke, Kuhn, and Bird, J. J. dissenting) that injunction should be denied. Guan v. Fitzpatrick, (Mich. I9I8), 168 N. W.
IS

1007.

The majority of the court seemingly content themselves with the observation that·on the facts there would be only one dwelling on lot SI, that the
terms of the restriction will thus be in fact observed, and that therefore equity
should not give plaintiff the relief asked for. Suppose lot SI or any lot in
the restricted district had been subdivided in ownership into two thirty foot
lots, and the owner of one of these had started to build thereon, would the
prevailing judges refuse relief?. Suppose the two owners had started the
erection of dwellings simultaneously, which one, if either, would the learned
judges enjoin? If they adjoined neither the result would be two houses on the
one sixty foot lot, clearly contrary to the intent and language of the re. striction; if ¢.ey enjoined both, then either the lot would have. to remain
vacant or one would have to buy out the other or so much of his thirty foot
lot as to leave it physically impossible to get a house erected on it. The
majority of the court, it is submitted, failed to attend sufficiently to the terms
of the restriction. "Each lot'' meant what? It would seem wholly clear that
each sixty foot lot was meant. It seemed to have been felt that it would be
a hardship upon defendant to have to buy up the remainder of the lot or to
get the consent of plaintiff. But how can that be if, as must be assumed, the.
defendant bought his portion with notice of the restriction? Cf. Walker v.
Renner, 6o N. J. Eq. 493.
C.ARRmRS-CUMMINS AM£NDM;l':NT AS TO LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.-

Household goods were boxed so as to be hidden from view, under a bill of
lading limiting liability to $10 per 100 lbs., at a freight charge based on such
valuation. The goods weighed· 480 Jbs. and were destroyed by fire. A j udgment for $s6S was affirmed in Thompson v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (Ld.),
174 Pac. 007. The development of the carriers liability may be found in
8 MICH. L. Rr:v. S3I, 9 MICH. L. Rev. 233, 11 MICH. L. Rr:v. 46o, s88, 13 M1cH.
L. Rr:v. 590, IS Cor.. L. Rr:v. 399, 47S· Hardly had the Supreme Court finally
upheld limitations based on the tariff rates qn file as required by law, no matter what the value of the goods, and regardless of whether the actual value
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was known to the carrier, Geo. N. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co. 236 U. S.- 278, 10 MICH. L. Riw. 317, 13 ib. 570, when ten days later the Cummins Amendment, to the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act was signed by the
President. Its intent was to prevent the carrier from escaping liability for the
actual value of goods injured or lost by its default. Less than a year and
a half later the Amendment of August, 1916, modified the Cummins Amendment:, but meantime a few cases had arisen and reached the courts of last
resort. In New York it had been decided tl1e Cummins Amendment had not
affected shipments of goods hidden from view by their wrappings. D'Utassy
v. Barrett, 157 N. Y. S. 916, affirmed, 219 N. Y. 420, in which the goods were
alleged to have been stolen by employees of the carrier, Granberry v. Taylor,
159 N. Y. S. 932. in which the goods were lost. In both cases a $so valuation
was held good. In McCormick v. Southern E:&prus Co. (\V. Va.) 93 S. E.
1048 the shipper, nothwithstanditig an express receipt limiting liability to $5
and a tariff based on that valnation, was allowed to recover $Joo for a "dark
Comish gamecock of fine breed." The cock was in a box covered with slats.
In the instant case the goods were hidden from view, but the shipper told
the agent they were household goods. The court held that under these circumstances the agent was entitled to fix a value and charge a rate commensurate
with the risk, and could not rely on a value stated by the shipper. Under the
Cummins Amendment the carrier might have limited liability by having the
shipper "state in writing the value of the goods."
That there are limits to the effect of liability limitations in a published
tariff on file with, and therefore presumptively approved by, the Interstate
Commerce Gommission is well brought out in Bostou & Maine R~. v. Piper,
38 S. Ct. 354- The bill of lading. and tariff sheets. contained the stipulation
that liability from unusual delay and detention, caused by the carrier's.
negligence, should be limited to the amount actually e.'tpCilded by the shipper for food and water while so detained. The court held -this to be no limitation of the amount Gf recovezy under an agree<} valuation, but an attempt to escape "liability for negligence by a contract ·whlch leaves practically no recovezy for damages Tesulting from such negligence.., It is submitted that such was the precise effect of the limitation upheld in Geo. N.
Price Co. v. Wells, Farg<J & Co.. .mpra, in which a recovery of $so was
allowed for an $18oo car-load of automobiles. The decision in tlie instant case.
seems to be correct, and hence the other should be wrong. See I3 MICR. L
Riw. 590.
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-~ CoM~-Plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, sued on a contract made in Michigan with defendants, a Michi.,oan
corporation. It was contended that the contract W3S void because a :Michigan
st;;tute provided that a fo~gn eotporation, not-authorized to do business in
?i-Iichigan, could"not make a valid contract:, in l\lichigan. and the plaintiff had
not been so authorized. Held, the malOng of the contract -was itself interstate commerce, and therefore outside the power of the s1ate.. American Distn"buting Co.. v. Hayu Wileel Co., (Marcli, 1918). 230 Fed. i[Q!).
The contract was one by whidi the plaintilf nndertook to act :as agent of
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the defendant in selling its product. It contemplated that plaintiff should sell '
goods for defendant, but was not itself a contract of sale. Federal regulation of commerce has been recognized as controlling the persons and property engaged in interstate transportation, the things transported, and the senders and recipients of things transported. Contracts of sale, whose direct
effect is to require transportation of something, have been held to be within
the control of Congress. Robbins v. Shelby Cou11ty, etc., 120 U. S. 489.
But further than this courts have been loath to go, and could not iogically
go. Transportation is essential to commerce. Railway Co., v. Huseii, 95 U.S.
4)5; County of Mobile, v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 6g1; Hammer v. Dage11lzart, U.
S. Sup. Ct., June 1918. Mere manufacturing or producing, though it may
result in interstate transportation, is not commerce. United States v. Knight
Co., 156 U. S. I; Del. L. & W. Ry. v. Yttrko11is, 238 U. S. 439. A contract
by a person in one state to labor in another is not commerce, though it will
result in commerce, Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270; nor to do other acts in
another state, Pac. Adv. Co., v. Conrad, 168 Cal. 91; nor is making a contract of insurance interstate commerce, although the principals live in different states, Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648;
N. Y. Life fos. Co., v Craven, 178 U. S. 389. The court in the principal
case seems to have ignored the "difference between a eontract of agency to
sell and a contract of sale.
CoNTRACTs-"MuTUALI'tY''-CouNTER PROMISE IMPL!ED.-Plaintiff wrote to
aefendant, ''We will undertake the sale of your wheels .•.. upon the following terms and conditions : Commissions.-On all orders received, accepted and shipped by your company you will pay us 3% of the net sales
price." This proposal was indorsed, "accepted," by the defendant. It was by
its terms to continue for five years. Before the expiration of that time defendant repudiated the agreement and plaintiff sued for damages resulting
from loss of future gains. Held, plaintiff could recover. American Distributing Co:, v. Hayes Wheel Co., (March, 1918), 250 Fed. rn9.
The issue made was whether the.contract was "void fur lack of mutuality." It was held that by the expression, "we will undertake the sale of
your wheels," read in connection with the phrase, "orders taken by us shall
be submitted for your acceptance, the plaintiff impliedly promised to use good
faith and diligence in obtaining orders, and that there was therefore mutuality
of obligation. See, in analogy, Novakovich v. Union Trust Co., 89 Ark. 412;
Gilmore & Co;, v. Samuels & Co., 135 Ky. 7o6. No question was raised as to
whether there was any promise on the defendant's part, as consideration for
the plaintiff's implied promise. Yet this would seem the more doubtful point.
Defendant promised nothing except to pay 3% commissions on "orders received, accepted and shipped" by it. There was no promise whatever that it
would accept and ship orders received, unless it could be implied. In Goodyear v. Koehler etc. Co., 143 N. Y. S. 1046, a very similar contract expressly
provided that the defendant should not be liable for refusal or neglect to
furnish the goods as ordered, and the court held that there was no mutuality
of obligation. A dissenting opinion urged that there was an implied promise
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to furnish the goods as ordered. An almost identical contract was upheld in - -Gile v. !titer-State Motol" Car Co., 27 N. D. 1o8, only on the ground that it
liad -been adhered to by both parties during its stipulated term, and had there•
fote become enforcible as a unilateral contract, whether or not it had been ___ _
enf'orcible in its inception. See 12 MICH. L. REV. 667. The necessary promise
was implied in Chi. R. I. & G. Ry., v. Martin, (Tex.), I63 S. W. 313, discussed in 12 MICH L. Rm. 6g4
M. c. A. A S P.A!a
oF "MruTARY OR NAVA!, FoRcss."-The Espionage Act (40 Stat. 21g, C. 30)
provides that "whoever, when the United States is at war, (1) shall wilfully
make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with
the operation or- success of its enemies," etc., shall be guilty of an offense.
Defendant was indicted for having said to numerous people while a "drive"
was on to raise funds for the war work of the Red Cross and Y. M. C. A.,
"I am through contributing to your private grafts. There is too much graft
in these subscriptions. No; I do not believe in the work of the Y. M. C. A.
or the Red Cross, for I think they are nothing but a bunch of grafters. No, sir,
I can prove it I won't give you a cent The Y. M. C. A, the Y. W. C. A,
and the Red Cross is a bunch of grafters. Not over 10 or 15 per cent of the
money collected goes to the soldiers or is used for the purpose for which it
is collected. Who is the government? Who is running this war? A bunch
of capitalists composed of the steel trust and munitions makers." On motion
to squash, /z.eld that the indictment stated an offense under the Act. United
States v. Nagler, (D. C. W. D. Wis., 1918), 252 Fed. 2I7.
It is not by any means every utterance, however disloyal the speaker may
thereby be indicated to be, that is covered by the Espionage Act, the Act covers only utterances affecting the military or naval forces. United States v.
Schutte, 252 Fed. 212. A strict application of th~ general rule that-criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed might conceivably lead to a conclusion
opposite to the one reached in the principal case. The court felt warranted in
upholding the indictment because of the relationship of the Red Cross and
Y. M. C. A. organizations with the forces in the field, created and recognized
by the President and the constituted authorities. The fact that the Red Cross
is recognized by international treaties and its members are by the Treaty of.
Geneva of August 12, I864, to be treated as neutrals when captured were deemed not to interfere with treating the organization as part of the military and
naval forces of the United States. No doubt it will be a source of great
satisfaction to most people that the circulation of such -vicious lies as were
repeated by the defendant in the principal case can be reached by criminal
proceedings.
0

CRillIN.AI, LAW-EsPIONAGS AC'l'-RsD CROSS ANDY.

CRIMIN.AI, LAw-Po\VSR oF PRosi>cuTING ATTORNSY TO ENT$ A Nox.u:
PRoS~QUI.-Respondent was judge of the Municipal Court of Chicago, and had

about 400 cases for violation of the Sunday liquor law pending in his court,
when the relator, tlie State's attorney of Cook County, proposed to enter a
1101le prosequi in every one of the cases. The judge refused to allow this to
be done, and the instant case was selected as a test case, the State's attorney
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filing a nolle prosequi and the judge refusing to enter it. Petition for mandamus commanding Judge Newcomer to enter of record this nolle prosequi
was denied, on the ground that the power of the State's attorney to enter
twlle prosequi was not absolute, but was subject to the consent of the court.
People ex rel Hoyiie v. Newcomer, (Ill. 1918), 120 N. E. 244At common law, in England, tlie power to enter a nolle prosequi was
lodged exclusively in the attorney gene111l, Regina v. Dmm, 1 Car. & Kir. 730,
and it was absolute, Queen v. Alleii, l B. & S. 850. In the United States the
prevailing rule is that the prosecuting officer has the same power in this regard
at the attorney general in England. Lizotte v. Dloska, 200 Mass. 327; People
v. District Court, 23 Colo. 466; 16 Cor. Jur. 434 But there are a few cases
which support the rule of the principal case. De11hain v. Robinson, 72 W. Va.
243, Ann. Cos. 1915 D, 997; State v. Moody, 6g N. C. 529. ·In others it is
held that the court is necessary for a 1wlle proseq11i after the trial commences
to the jury, State v. Roe, 12 Vt. 93; State v. Hickling, 45 N. J. L. 152. In
some states the consent of the court is expressly required by statute, Statham v. State, 41 Ga. 507; People v. McLeod, I Hill (N. Y.), 377, 405.
E:.i:rnNT DoMAIN-CoNDEMATION FOR CANTONMENT.-In proceedings
by the Government to acquire for temporary use land for construction of a
military camp it was held that the owner was entitled to rental value based
on the value of the land without improvements, and to compensation for improvements which will necessarily be destroyed, and in addition the Government should obligate itself to return the land in as good condition as when
taken, or to make compensation for future injuries due to the military use.
In re Condemnation of Lands for Military Camps, 250 Fed. 314
Many delicate questions have arisen from the construction of our canton-ments. Under the Act of July 2, 1917, C. 35, 40 Stat. 241, the Secretary of
War was authorized to institute proceedings in court to condemn temporary
use of land, or other interest therein, in the meantime taking immediate possession thereof. Under this power farmers, in some cases at least, were paid a flat
rental of $5 per acre for their farms, with no assurance of any allowance for
permanent injuries from the cutting of trees or impairment of the land by
reason of the packing of the soil. Claims against the Government are very
uncertain and expensive luxuries in many cases. Some Civil War claims are
still before the Court of Claims and some despairing of the judicial route, or
not being willing to submit to judicial investigation, are constantly before
Congress. The rule of damages laid down in this case is fair, but the fairest
provision is that the court will keep jurisdiction of the case till future damages can be assessed. This is an especially equitable disposal of the case,
and saves the land owner from the doubtful remedy of a suit against the
Government.
LIBi>r.-PUBLICATION-DICTATION To TYPIST.-W, a solicitor, in dictating
to his typist a bill of costs, to be sent to his client, as a matter of office routine, inserted in the bill, without malice, information which was ddamatory
to plaintiff, though relevant and reasonably necessary to enable the client
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to understand what the bill was for. Held: There was not such a publieation by the dictation to the typist as creates a liabillty for libel. Morgan v.
Wallis, (1917, K. B. Div.), 33 T. L. R 495.
Mr. Justice DART.ING says: ''For my own part I think that this doctrine
of publication of libel by putting the thing before a typist verges on the
absurd.*** Publication of a libel may be a criminal offence for which a man
may receive a very heavy sentence, and to say that submitting a draft to ·a
typist who will simple rattle it over a typewriter, hardly comprehending what
the thing says is a publication which may involve man in a criminal charge.
is to my mind, verging on the absurd I do not say that it is absurd, because
other judges have said it is a publication.*** Therefore as far as publication goes. I shall not leave it to a jury." In Pullman v. Hill & Co. (r891),
1 Q. B. D. 524. (C. A.) Lord Es~, M. R; in ruling that the dictation of a
libelous letter to a shorthand clerk by the manager of a commercial company was a publication, said: ''What is the meaning of 'publication'? The
making known the defamatory matter after it has been written to some person other than the person of whom it is written. If the statement is sent
straight to the person of whom it is written here is no publicaion of it.~**
If .the writer of a letter locks it up in his own desk, and a thief comes and
breaks open the desk and takes away the letter and makes its contents known,
I should say that would not be a publication. If the writer of a letter shows
it to his own clerk in order that the clerk may copy it ·for him, is that a
publication of the letter? Certainly it is showing it to a third ·person.***
I cannot, therefore, feel any doubt that if the writer of a letter shows it
to any person other than to whom it is written, he publishes it." Lorss and
l(;\Y, LL. J., expressed themselves in a similar way. In _the case of Bo:rsius
v. Goblet Freres (1894), l Q. B. Div. 842 (C; A.), Lord Esmm, M. Rand
LoPSS and DAVEY, LL. J., held that the dictation of a libelous letter to a
client, by a solicitor to his stenographer in the ordinary course of his business, and in the proper and prompt discharge of his duty to his client, was
a publication, but if without malice was a priVileged publication,-the solicitor having the privilege of his client to send a letter directly to the plaintiff,
and to use such incidental means of doing this as would enable him to perform his duty to his client promptly. In Edmondson v. Birch & Co. Ltd.
(1907), x K B. Div. (C.A.) 371, this privilege was extended to one business
company in communicating to another, on a privileged occasion, througn a typewritten letter dictated to a stenographer. In the United States it was
early held, and has not been question~d, that getting a libelous ·letter copied. in writing for one by another is a publication. to the latter. Kienc v. ·Ruff
(1855), 1 Ia 482; Adams v. Lawson (1867), 17 Gratt. 250, 94 Am. Dec. 455. So in Gambrill v. Schooley (1901), 93 Md. 48, 413 Atl. 730, 52 L. R. A. 87,
86 Am. St. R 414. it was ruled that dictation of a letter to a stenograplier
was a publication, relying on the Pullman ca_se above. The same view :is
taken in Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Bailey (1902), IOI Va. 443, 44 S. E. 692;
Puterbaugh v. Gold Med . .Mfg. Co. (1904), 7 Ont. L. R 582, I Am. Cas. 100;
Ferdon v. Dickens (1909), 161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888. On the other hand the
following recent cases take a different view. Owen v. Ogilvie Pub. Co.
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(1898), 32 App. D. 465, 53 N. Y. 1033; Central R.R. Co. v. Jones (1916),
18 Ga. App. 414, 89 S. E. 429; Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel & Kaufman
(1917), II3 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278.
MORTGAGES-FORECLOSURE BY JUNIOR MORTGAGEE NOT PARTY TO PRIOR FoRECLOSURE OF SENIOR MoRTGAGE.-A first- mortgage was foreclosed by action and
sale without the owner of a second mortgage being made party. The latter
now sues to foreclose, making defendants the purchaser under the prior sale
and his subsequent mortgagee, and asking that the land be sold and the proceeds applied in payment of the liens in order of priority. On the prior sale
the land brought more than enough to satisfy the senior mortgage. The particular relief seems to have been opposed. Held, that complainant was entitled to the relief prayed. Union Bank v. Cook, Supreme Court of South
Carolina, June 25, 1918, g6 S. E. 484.
Insofar as it holds that the former suit had, on the one hand, no efficacy
to displace complainant's lien, but had, on the other hand, the effect of transferring to the purchaser thereunder all the rights of the parties thereto,
and that the senior mortgage so acquired by the purchaser would not merge
in the equity of redemption by the purchaser but would be kept on foot, on
the principle of subrogation, and that the purchaser's equitable right to the
benefit.of the first mortgage passed to his subsequent mortgagee-to this extent, the case involves the application of unquestioned principles, though unusual in its circumstances. As to the propriety of the specific relief here
granted, however, the authorities are not so clear. . It would seem to be
axiomatic that the former suit to which the junior mortgagee was not a party
should not affect his remedies any more than his substantive rights, except
in so far as it might operate as a transfer of the adverse interests and so require him to prosecute. his remedies against different parties-a result which
might have been brought about by voluntary conveyance. What, then, was the
junio1--martgagee's right of foreclosure before the prior suit? Although it is
often stated that the only purpose of a foreclosure suit is to subject to the
payment of the debt the estate which the mortgagor had at the execution of
the mortgage, and hence that the only proper parties are the mortgagor and
subsequent transferees and encumbrancers, it is generally conceded that a
junior mortgagee may join a senior lienor, whose lien is matured, and have
the premises sold free from both liens and the proceeds applied in satisfaction of both, in the order of their priority. Hagen v. Walker, 14 How. 37;
Cullum v. Erwin, 4 Ala. 452; Masters v. Templeton, 92 Ind. 447; Hcimst1-cct
v. Winnie,. IO Ia. 430; Emigrant Bank v. Goldman, 75 N. Y. 127; Person v.
Merrick, 5 Wis. 231. There is some doubt about the right of the junior
mortgagee to force foreclosure of the senior mortgage over objection. Foster
v. Johnson, 44 Minn. 290; Missouri Trust Co. v. Richardson, 57 Neb. 617;
Hudnit v. Nash, 16 N. J. Eq. 550; Bexar Building Assn. \'. Newman, 86 'l'cx.
38o. It was said in the principal case that this could be done only upon a
showing that the property would probably produce more than the amount of
the senior encumbrance. But it is almost universally held that whatever
right of foreclosure the junior mortgagee had in the first instance he still has
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after a suit_ to .foreclose the senior mortgage, to which he was not a party~
Cptti;rl"* v: binStrmig, IOI Ind. _258; F4ster v. loh11son, 44 Minn. 290; Pea"body v. Roberts, 47 Barb. 91; Besser v. Hawtlumi.e, 3 Ore. 129; Turner v.
Phelps, 4) Tex. 251. See also Alexander v. Gree11wood, 24 Cal. 5o6. Contra, Rose v. Walk, I49 Ill. 6o, approved in J?_odman v. Quick, 2u Ill. 546. 555.
P.\RTN£RS AS TuNANTs IN CoMMON.-The Sewcll's (plaintiffs below)
claim title ·to certain mineral rights based on a conveyance "by John Sebastian to J. \V. Sewell & Co., which was a partnership composed of John W.Sewell and Harriet Sewell-father and mother, respectively, of plaintiffs,
whose rights descended in equal shares to plaintiffs, their children and heirs
at law; The Kentucky Coal Co. claims through a de\•ise by Sebastian sub·
sequent to this conveyance." Held, "the deed to J. W. Sewell and Co. vested
the legal title in the partners as tenants in common." Ke11tucky Block Camiel
Coal Co. et al. v. Sewell et al. (C. C. A. 6th circ.) 249 Fed. 84o.
The inadequacy of the terminology of common law tenure to describe
accurately the nature of the conjoint holding by partners has frequently been
mentioned (Cf. 9 Cor,. L. Rsv. 213, ff.; 29 HARv. L. Rsv. 163; 15 MlCR. L.
RF.v. 618, ff.) Lord HoI.T, in Heydon v. Heydon, apparently considered partners as joint tenants and a vendee of either partner's interest a tenant in
common with the other partners, but the rigid application of that doctrine
in instances where parties were claiming through the rights of partners
as such and not through their rights as tenants has caused the confusion
that has heo..n so often deplored. The use of the it!accurate terminology
in the instant case will do no harm if it is plainly recognized that the court
is describing the nature of the conjoint holding without reference to any
partnership acthities in dealing with the. property. The Sewells-father and
mother-received the property as tenants by entireties (being husband and
wife) and dealt with it during their lives as partners. At their death their
children and heirs at law received the interests of the parents and held, apparently, by the old common law title of- coparceners, but as the Coal Company were claiming through a later conveyance of Sebastian and there was
no question as to the partnership rights of the elder Sewells or any creditors of
them as partners, the description of the elder Sewells as tenants in common may
be considered as meaning nothing more than that they held conjointly under
a conveyance which was prior to the one to the Coal Comp~my and therefore
tliey and their heirs took precedence in the chain of title. Any dispute as to
the meaning of the decision would be avoided by the adoption of the terminology of our new UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Ar::r. In Section 25 (r) of ·this
Act a holding such as that of ·the elder Sewells is correctly termed a tenancy
in partnership and for this terminology we have a good old common law
precedent as early as the time of Edward III. (Cf. STATHA'MS AmunGmraT
-OF THE LAW. Translated by Klingelsmith, p. 7; 15 MICH• .LAW Rzy. 618,
note 32.)
·
P.t;RSONS SuBJF.CT 'l'O Mn:;rtARY LAW.-Sµbdivision (d) of Art. 2, of the
Articles of \Var, (Sec. 13f2, R. S., as amended by Act of Congress, Aug. 29,
1916), relating to "persons subject to military law," reads: "(d). All re-
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tamers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the armies
of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
and in time of war all such retainers and persons accompanying or serving
with the armies of the United States in the field, both within and without
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, thought not otherwise subject to these articles." The words "acompall'yiug or," were not in "the old
article, number 63. Two recent cases applying this subdivision are of inter·
est. G, a civilian employee of the U. S. Shipping Board, went to Europe
as a mate on a military transport; he was there discharged, and sent back
to the United States on another transport. He volunteered to stand watch
on the vessel, and did so for several days, but finally refused to continue.
For this disobedience to the order of the army officer in command of the
vessel, he was tried by court-martial and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. On habeas corpus (after reaching the United States), it was held he
was "accompanying" the army, "voluntarily serving with it," "in the field,"
and was punishable as a person "subject to military law" under this article.
E~ parte Gerlach (1917), 247 Fed. R. 616.
F applied to the Bureau of the U. S. Army Transport Service, which is
under the Quartermaster's Department, for employment, was accepted, entered into an agreement to serve, and was assigned to duty as chief cook
on a steamship then lying at Brooklyn, engaged in transporting supplies for
the U. S.· Army. Just before the ship sailed for a foreign port, F attempted
to leave the ship with his baggage to desert the service, and refused to return
thereto. He was arrested by the military police, sent to Camp Merritt, N. J.,
and tried hy a court-martial. He sued out a writ of habeas co'rp11s: II eld:
Although a civilian employee, he was "serving with the armies in the field,"
and a ccurt-martial had jurisdiction to try him for his attempt ·to desert;
also he qm not question the jurisdiction of the court-martial to impose the
death or other penalty (A. W. 58), on the ground that he was not charged
"on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury," under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, since that expressly excepted "cases
arising in the land or naval forces." The court says the words "in the field,"
do not refer to land only, but to any place, whether on land or water, apart
from the permanent cantonments or fortifications where military operations
are being conducted."
RATES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES-RIGHT OF CARRIER TO R£!'ARATION WHEN
CoMPELL"ED To CARRY AT CoNFISCATORY RATE.-The case of M. St. P. _& S. S.
M. Ry. v. Washbum Lignite Coal Co., (N. D.), 168 N. W. 684, is an echo of
the Lignite Coal Case, 236 U. S. 585. The latter case decided that the rates
fixed by the legislature of North Dakota for the carriage of lignite coal were
confiscatory, and dissolved an injunction restraining the carrier from charging
more than the statutory rates. The present case is an action to recover from
the coal company $2,6000, the alleged difference between the statutory rate and
a reasonable rate for carrying coal for defendant company while the injunction
was in force. It has often been held that a shipper paying under protest more
than a reasonable freight rate may recover the excess. The question here is

MICHIGAN L.AW. REV!J~~ can a carrier recover a deficiency when it has been compelled by action of the··
court. to carry at-a confiscatory rate. The positions seem reciprocaf; but sotrie
very nice questions are raised. The court held, Robillson J. dissenting, that
there could be no recovery by the carrier.
Beginning with the K110.:rville Water Case, 212 U. S. l and the Consolidated Gas Case, 212 U. S. 19, the Supreme Court of the United States has
often decreed an experiment to determine what would be the returns from
certain rates, without prejudice to the right of the public ~tility to reopen
the case if adequate trial proves them non-remunerative. The most important
of these cases are referred to in the instant case. Of these the Lig11ite Coal
Case, supra, was one in which the United States Supreme Court, after the
experiment, found the trial rates confiscatory. Plaintiff by decree of court
was coerced to carry at those rates, it was· thereby deprived of its property,
can it now recover the loss? The court finds there is no tort liability orli~-- fendant. Liability, if any, must be contract. There was no express contract
to pay a higher rate. and it seems unreasonable to hold there was an implied
one. There is complete absence of any implied consent of ·defendant to pay
further freight bills if the litigation should finally prove the company had
a right to a higher rate. His contracts with his customers were probably
based on the tariffs he paid, and not on any implied promise to the carrier
to pay a higher charge. if after years of litigation it should be decided the
tariff was too low. Perhaps the most interesting suggestion of the case is
that here is a coi1tract by operation of law, a case ·of-unjust enrichment.
The court finds that to allow this would give plaintiffs a remedy a~ainst one
who has done no wrong. and who would be unable to recoup his loss from
those who had really benefited, the consumers of the commodity. What protection, then, shall public utilities have against such deprivation of property.
They have sometimes been allowed to charge the higher rate ,giving the
public rebate slips, 16 Mien. L. R. 379. The court might of course protect
them by the form of the decree. Where one of these mea.,s is not permitted
it seems to be a case of dam11mm absque injttria.
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY oF \VHOLESOME:NE:ss-CA?'[NED Gooos.-The
plaintiff bought a can of baked beans from the defendant who_ was a retail
dealer. The brand was of a widely known variety. While eating the same the
plaintiff broke his tooth on a pebble which was proven to have been among the
beans in the can. An action was brought on the implied warranty that the
beans were wholesome and fit for consum,ption. The Code provided that
"where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, ·and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, whetber he be the grower or
manufacturer, or not, there is an implied. warranty that the goods ·shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose." Jfrld, for plaintiff. Ward v. Great Atla11tic
& Pacific Tea Co., (Mass. 1918), 120 N. E. 225.
The code is but declaratory of the common law. Cook v. Darling, 160
I\Iich. 4i5, 481. 'Where the particular purpose is the consumption as food,
the food must be wholesome. Barrington v. Hotel Astor, I i I 1N. Y. Supp.
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The difficulty in the p_rin-

cipal case is to determine whether the yendee relied on the judgment and
skill of the vendor. On this point the courts are in conflict. Julum v. Laubenberger, 16 Misc. (N. Y.), 646, created an exception in the case of canned
goods; the court said: " . • • • the defendant sells a can of food • . . . It is
well known and must be well known to both parties, that he h~s not in-

5pected it, that he is entirely ignorant of the contents of the can, except so
far as he had purchased from respectable dealers on the market . . • • if the
purchaser desires to protect himself he may ask for an investigation at the
time of purchasing, or he may get an express warranty as to the quality of
the gooCls." The dissenting opinion in the principal case takes thi~ view. In
Bigelow v. Maitle Central Railroad Co., no Me. 105, the court denied an implied warranty of wholesomeness but admitted that the vendee got a warranty
that the food was of "a reputable brand, packed and inspected in accordance
with approved methods." These courts no doubt have the correct view on
strict interpretation of the principles of the law of sales. The better holding,
hov.;ever, is that of the prevailing opinion, for reasons well stated in Chapman
v. Rogge11kamp, 182 Ill. App. II7: " •••. public safety demands that there
should-be an implied warranty •••• as a general rule, in the sale of provisions
the vendor has so many more facilities for ascertaining the soundness or unsoundness of the article offered for sale than are possessed by the purchaser
to assume the risk." See also, Sloan v. Woolworth, 193 Ill. App. 620; Cook v.
Darling, stipra. It is a strong argument of the prevailing opinion, also, that
the implied warranty must be regarded as a necessary inference from "the
relation of the parties." It could hardly be expected that the customer should
follow the suggestion of the N. Y. court in Julian v. Laube11berger. It would
be imQractical to open the can at the store; and it would be equally impractical
to ask for an express warranty in all retail purchases when the small purchases are so numerous.· It would seem that an implied warranty ought to
be imposed from. the nature of the retailer's business and the peculiar relation of dealer and customer. Dealers in food should be insurers of wholesomeness whether retailers or otherwise. The public interest so demands.
The English courts are in accord with the principal case, Jackson v. Watson,
(1909). 2 K. B. 193.
Sl'~TFic PFRFORMANa:-S'tA'tu~ oF FRAuDs-P.AR't PF.RFOP.MANcF-Mu-

REMEI>v:.-Defendants entered into au oral contract with the plaintiff for the purchase of a house and lot for $1,8oo. Defendants paid plaintiff .
$100, entered into possession of the house, which plaintiff vacated for that
purpose, and made e.'<tensive changes in the premises which lessened their
value Defendants subsequently refused to complete the contract. Bill by
the plaintiff for specific performance. Held, that, inasmuch as part performance by the purchaser (defendants) took the case out of the statute of
frauds so that he might have maintained suit against the vendor (plaintiff),
the plaintiff may have relief. Pearson v. Gard11er et al. (Mich. 1918), 168
N. \V. 485·
The decision is placed squarely upon the ground of mutuality of remedy.
TUAI.I'tY oF
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This is unfortunate for a number of reasons. In the first place, it seems to
imply that there was not part performance by the vendor. Where possessfun
is given under an oral contract oi s;i.le, it operates both for and against the
purchaser. ·The owner has allowed the purchaser. to do an act on the
strength of the contract,-to-wit: enter on the land; the purchaser has induced the owner to do an act on the faith of the contract: withdraw from
the land. Both are therefore bound in jurisdictions where taking possession
is a sufficient act of part performance. Wilso1~ v. Hartlepool Ry. Co., 2
De G. J. & S. 475, 485; FRY: SP!lCIFic P.F.RFORMANCE, (ed. 5) § 004- In Michigan. mere possession is not enough; but if expenditure by way of improvements and the exercise of acts· of ownership will, in addition to possession,
amount to part performance for the purchaser, it seems clear that giving up
possession to the purchaser and permitting him to do acts which materially_lessen the value of the premises should operate in favor of the vendor. The
principle in either case is the same. In the second place the doctrine of
mutuality of remedy does _not furnish the easy solution which -the court
assumes. It is now an exploded doctrine, so many exceptions having accumulated that the principle is to all intents and purposes gone. Even if it be
accepted, -One of the recognized exceptions relates to the statute of frauds.
If the defendant had signed a memorandum of the -contract, the plaintiff
might have had specific performance, even though the defendant could not
hold him to the contract. Ain:s, MuTUAI.ITY IN SPECIFIC Psm10RMANCF., 3
Co1,. L. REv. I, 5, LllCTURSS LEGAI. HISTORY, 370, 373. For cases, see AMES,
CASES EQUITY, 421, n. I. It is difficult to reconcile this decision with such
a firmly established exception. Again, it has more than once been declared
that the acts of part performance must be done by the party seeking to enforce the contract; indeed it is believed that it would be difficult to gnd a
case where that was not the situation. Cf. Po:MEROY, · CoN'tRACTS (ed. 2)
§ I05. Finally it is by no means clear that the defendant would be entitled
to specific performance. Where something in -addition to possession is required the better view is 'that the acts done must be beneficial to the estate.
Hollis v. Edwards, I Vern. I59; Wolfe v. Frost, 4 Sand. Ch. 79; Clicsmberlain v. Manning, 4I N. J. Eq. 65I. The court seems deliberately to have
selected the weakest basis upon which to support its decision.
TRESPASS-DAMAGES-NOTICE To AGENT-Wau101, TtESPASSER.-Where
suit was brought against a defendant in trespass for cutting timber from
the plaintiff's land, the defendant having relied upon the advice of his attorney that his title to such land was good; held, though the defendant was.
charged with his attorneys knowledge as to the claims of third persons,·
where he had no actual knowledge thereof and acted in good faith upon the
advice of this attorney, he was not guilty of moral bad faith and should be
allowed the expenses incurred by him in cutting and removing the timber.
Alim v. Frank Janes Co., Limited (La., 19I8), 78 South n5.
In measuring the damages for cutting and removing timber by trespassers the court made a distinction between legal and moral bad faith. One
who had knowledge that he had no title to lands, because of the imputation
to him of his agent's knowledge of the facts, was held to be guilty of legal
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bad faith only. The coort applied the same role of damages usually applied
to cases of innocent as distinguished from cases of willful trespass and
probably intended the terms to be used synonymously. The principal is liable to third persons for all acts committed by his agent within the actual
or apparent scope of his agency, Mather v. Banies et al., 146 Fed. IOOO. On
the question as to whether the malicious acts of the agent imposed any lia•
bility on the principal when not done with his assent, there is a decided con•
filct of authority. 2 C. J. 854 (Sec. 537). But in the instant case it is not
an act of the agent but his knowledge which is imputed to the principal. It is
a well settled general rule that a principal is affected with constructive
knowledge, regardless of his actual knowledge,'"of all the material facts of
which his agent receives notice or acquire..s knowledge, while acting in the
course of his employment, although the agent· does not in fact inform his
principal thereof. Armstrong v. Asliley, 204 U. S. 272; Daw v. Lally, 213
Mass. 578. Thus notice to an agent for the purchase of land of the rights
of another therein is notice to his principal of such defects in title. Blair v.
Whittaker, 31 Ind. App. 664 If then the defendant in this case had the
knowledge of the attorney that there was a· defect in his title, in entering
upon the premises he was a willful trespasser. and logically-should not have
been allowed his expenses. But as the rule is in some cases ·a harsh one its
operation should be rightly confined to those cases to which it is strictly
applicable and it cannot be invoked for the purpose of imputing actual
malice in the conduct of the principal because of the facts known to the
agent. Tre11tor v. Potlzen, 46 Minn. 298; Reisaii v. Mott 42 Minn. 49. The
principal case affords an illustration of the attempts on the part of the
courts to restrict the doctrme of knowledge by imputation so as not to cause
injustice or hardship.
WoRKMEN's CoMPSNSATION -AccmENT IN CoURSE oF EMPLOYMSNT. Claimant sought compensation under the statute for the death of her .husband who suffered a heat stroke while carrying on work pursuant to his
employment by defendant. There was no evidence that deceased was. .. exposed by his employment to any greater degree of heat than was any other
member of the community generally. Held, in view of the fact that the
Pennslvania statute provides for compensation for personal injuries resulting from accident received "in the course of employment", claimant should
recover. Lane v. Horn & Hardarl Baking Co. (Penna. 1918), I04 Atl. 615.
In almost every other state these facts would not present a case for compensation, the statutes very generally requiring that the injuries shall have
been received not only "in the course of employment" but "out of the employment" as well. HONNOLD, WoRKYtN's CoMPtNSATION, Sec. JOI. Injuries
from lightning, unless the victim was specially exposed by his employment
to such dangers, are thus not within the provisions of the acts generally.
In Pennsylvania, though, a person struck by lightning is entitled to compensation if at the time of injury he is working at his job as an employee,
but not if he is at home or is not engaged in the business of his employment.
The act in Pennsylvania, then, is really an insurance for all employees against
accidental injuries received while on the job. The statutes generally may
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be said to be insurances for employees against such injuries only where there-is some causal connection between the employment and the injury. On the
question as to the existence of such· causal connection see 16 MlCR. L. Riw.
179· See also Cetmell v. Dani.els Co. (Mich.), 168 N. W. 1009.
WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION-WoRKMEN Wno
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MAKING UP REQUIRED NuMnr:R.-Part A, Sec. z of Connecticut P. A. 1913,
C. 138, the Workmen's Compensation Act of that state provides that the Act
shall not apply to employees of any employer "having regularly less than
five employees," etc. Defendants, conducting an amusement park, had three
employees who quite clearly were "regularly" emplOyed; claimant's deceased
was one of these. On two nights of each week, when the weather was
good, dances were given, the music being furnished by two orchestras of
three or more pieces each, sometimes one orchestra being on duty, at other
times the other. Held, the musicians were properly counted in making up
the required number of five employees. Boyle v. Mahoney & Tierney (Conn.
1918), 103 Atl. 12'/.
So far as the musicians were concerned the attention of the court seems
· to have been directed to the question of their being employees of independent
contractors ; having concluded that they were not such, the court apparently takes it for granted that they were "regularly" employed. Quite a
number of states have similar limitations in their workmen compensation
acts, but there is a complete dearth of authority as to what sort of em- ployees are to be counted in making up the specified number. SUPpose an
employer has four regular employees and a scrubwoman who comes in to
clean up the office once each month. Is she to be counted as making up
the required five? Or suppose a small corporation has clearly four such
employees and has arrangements with the cashier of a local bank to keep
the books and act as secretary, not, however, as an officer. Should be be
counted as the fifth? In the absence of a controlling definition in the Act
itself, it is proper to look to the object sought to be attained. Why was
the Act limited to employees whose employer has regularly five or more
employees? A comprehensive scheme for compensation to injured workmen grew out of a feeling, first of a certain inequality between employee
and employer, and, second, that the industry should bear the burden resulting from injuries received in the course and out of employment. A number limitation as in Connecticut, it is believed, was put into the statute because it was felt that there was need of such sweeping changes in liability
only where an employee by reason of being one of many was more exposed to industrial accident. The Kansas Act (Laws 19II, C. 218, §8) provides expressly: "It is hereby determined that the necessity for, this law
and the reason for its enactment, exist only with regard to employers who
employ a considerable number of persons. This Act, therefore, shall only
apply to employers by whom five or more workmen have been employed
continuously," etc. In view of these considerations it is believed that it is
questionable whether the court in the principal case should have counted
the musicians. :?ee in general, Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571.

